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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM ANDREWS,
Petitioner,

v.

Case No. 18230
PETITION FOR REHEARING

LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden
of the Utah State Prison,
Respondent.
Petitioner William Andrews hereby moves the Court for
rehearing and reconsideration of its decision, issued November 16,
1983, denying his Petition for habeas corpus and reaffirming his
sentence of death.

With all respect, Petitioner submits this Court

has misapprehended the facts of this case, misapplied the law, and
denied him the equal protection of the law of this State.
Petitioner will not reiterate all the arguments he has made
here before in this rehearing petition.
however, and adopts them by reference.

He maintains them,
The argument in this

petition will limit itself to those specific areas in which
Petitioner believes the Court has misappreneded the facts or
misapplied the law to his case.
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1.

The Facts

The statement of facts in the appendix to the court's
opinion reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence of
the culpability ,of Petitioner William Andrews.
evidence anyone was "forced by [Andrews]

There was no

••. to drink a caustic

chemical substance capable of causing their death."
Walker testified that

~ierre

did that.

Ibid.

Orren

Tr. 3075-76, 3085-87, 3183.

No witnesses testified that "the substance would have caused the
death of the ••• victims ••• but for the promptness of the medical
attention given to them."

There was certainly evidence that

Andrews made an "effort to halt the course of events".
3072, 3073-74, 3091, 3183.

And it

~s

See Tr.

simply not true that "Andrews

was present and either assisted or observed Pierre during all the
events described" in the court's appendix.

See Tr. 3093, 3100-10,

3188.
There is a very real question as to whether the death
penalty could constitutionally be imposed on William Andrews, under
any standard.

See Enmund v. Florida, 50 U.S.L.W. 5087 (July 2,

1982); Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F.2d 75 (5th Cir.
1982); Jones v. Thigpen, 555 F.Supp. 870 (S.D. Miss. 1983); People
v. Tiller, 447 N.E.2d 174 {Ill. 1983), cert. denied
(1983); State v. McDaniel, 665 P.2d 70 (Ariz. 1983).

U.S.
Certainly, in

light of these facts, the error in the sentencing standard applied
in his case cannot be harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt."
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2.

The Question of Retroactivity

This Court's attempt to apply federal retroactivity analysis
to this case consistently overlooks one critical fact: this case is
sui generis.

Though there may be a difference in the purpose

served by the wood standard and the purpose of the reasonable doubt
standard at the guilt phase of a criminal trial, the major
constitutional difference is that the need for

c~rtitude

and

consistency is greater where life and death are at stake.

See

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625 (1980); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1977).
If the purpose of the wood standard was to promote
"fairness", Petitioner had as much right to a fair trial as Walter
Wood, Joseph Paul Franklin (to whose trial court this Court rushed
its wood decision before it was final, see Yocum Affidavit,
Petition Exhibit D), and all the cases that have enjoyed it since.
If the purpose of the Wood standard was to promote "consistency"
(slip op. 19), the result of this decision is to destroy that, by
consistently applying the same standard in all cases except these
petitioners.
Wood may have been a "'clear break with the past'" (slip op.
21), but the only past there was is this case: in no other capital
case affirmed by this Court has the jury been instructed in the
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manner it was here.l

In the only other case with this instruction

error, where the defendant's crime was certainly no less serious
than this one, the death penalty was reversed.

See State v. Brown,

607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980).
The Court never deals with the second aspect of the Johnson
test, "the extent of reliance on the old rule •••• "
17.

That is understandable, because there was none.

Slip op. at
No other case

would have to be reversed by a holding that this rule was
retroactive, as this Court well knows.

Because of that, the

statement that it "would not serve the administration of justice"
to so hold (slip op. 21) translates into a statement that "the
administration of justice" requires these petitioners to die--while
Gerald Brown, Walter Wood, Joseph Franklin, John Calhoun, and
others guilty of similar crimes are let live.
meaning of-Johnson's objective tests.

That is not the

It is a euphemism for a

deliberate denial of the equal protection of the law.

1 The Court's statement that "a higher standard may have in fact
been employed in some non-jury cases" prior to Wood (slip op. 21
n.5) overlooks the fact that the wood standard was given to the
juries in State v. John Michael Calhoun and State v. Joseph Paul
Franklin. see Petition Ex. B. The C~urt is also incorrect "that
prior to Brown, the Pierre standard was consi~tently used in
capital prosecutions, see, e.g., State v~ Cod1anna, Utah, 573 P.2d
343 (1977) •••• " Slip op. at 21. The Pierre standard was not
applied by the trial court in Codianna. And if "e.g." means "for
example", there are no other examples that either Respondent or the
Court have pointed to.
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3.

The Equal Protection Question.

Petitioner made it clear in his petition here that he
limited the issues to those which arose out of the Wood decision,
and did not attempt to relitigate those issues this Court had
previously rejected in this case.
10.

See Petitioner's Reply Memo at

Petitioner has therefore not again proffered the evidence this

Court refused to hear in Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 825 (Utah
1980), regarding the arbitrary and racially discriminatory manner
in which the death penalty had been imposed throughout the State of
Utah, and the particular evidence of discrimination against
Petitioner in this case.

That evidence has been gathered for a

hearing in federal court--and Petitioner remains willing to present
it in state court; but this Court has refused to hear it.
Petitioner has made a new and distinct claim here: that
singling him and his codefendant out for treatment different from
that given every other Utah capital defendant would deny him the
equal of the law.

See Petition at 3.

Though ail the cases in

which that standard had been applied up to the time of wood
involved white defendants, and

th~

inconsistent positions of the

Attorney General of Utah in Petitioner's case and these others,
give this claim a racial aspect, it does not rest on race alone. It
rests on the simple obligation of the State to apply its law
evenhandedly, in all cases before it, the most basic and literal
kind of equal protection of the law.

That is what Petitioner has

been denied here.
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Petitioner did not provide affidavits "regarding the facts
and circumstances" of the cases in which the wood standard was
earlier applied, because he had no idea this Court would find those
relevant, and Respondent never claimed they were.

Surely, the

Court was familiar with the facts of the cases of Walter wood and
Gerald Brown.

And Petitioner provided descriptions of the case of

Joseph Paul Franklin (Petitioner's Brief at 4) and of John Michael
Calhoun (Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9 n.9).

One of the Justices

of this· Court, the author of this opinion, sentenced Robert
Phillips (see Petition Ex. D); Petitioner understands that case
involved a robbery murder of a taxicab driver.

Finally, Petitioner

specifically asked the Court to remand this case for evidence on
t~is

point, if it somehow found this information relevant or the

affidavits insufficient.

See Petitioner's Brief at 13 n.5.

Petitioner cannot understand how anyone can prove that a different
result might have obtained in those cases (and others decided
since) under a different sentencing standard--at least not without
a hearing at which the sentencers themselves could be called.

If

the Court maintains that question is relevant, Petitioner renews
his request for such a hearing here.
Petitioner maintains this issue can and should be decided as
a matter of law, however, simply on the basis of the difference in
the instructions here.

As Petitioner has previously noted, the

court's assumption that the Utah statute, prior to Wood, was
constitutional is simply not warranted.

Zant v. Stephens, 51

6
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U.S.L.W. 4891 (June 22, 1983) added additional authority to his
argument that statutes of this type--which require no jury
findings, do not substantially

narrow the scope of capital crimes,

and provide for no specific appellate sentencing review--are
unconstitutional.

See 51 U.W.L.W. at 4894-95.

This Court's

decision in Wood may cure that constitutional defect; but denying
this Petitioner the benefit of that protection can only compound
it.
4.

The Question of Harmless Error.

The Court's alternative finding of harmless error in this
case is remarkable, in light of its recognition that "[n]o measure
of 'accuracy' exists whereby that decision [to impose the death
penalty] can be analyzed in the same way as the decision about
whether a fact is true or false."

Slip op. at 20.

Certainly, the

harmless error standard the Court has fashioned for this case is
fnconsistent with that fact, and the law elsewhere.
The Court's citation of the harmless error rule upheld in
Barclay v. Florida, 51 U.S.L.W. 5206 (July 6, 1983) overlooks a
fundamental fact about that Florida rule: it applied only where
there is a specific finding that "there were no statutory
mitigating circumstances •••• n

51 u.s.L.W. 5213 n.12.

Here there

was no such finding, and substantial evidence of several statutory
and non-statutory mitigating factors.
at 9 n.9 & 10.

See Petitioner's Reply Brief

The Court's citation of Zant v. Stephens, is

similarly misleading.

The Georgia Supreme Court's review "to avoid

7
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arbitrariness and to assure proportionality" differs substantially
from anything this Court is required to do by statute, or has ever
done.

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).

The Court

has never purported to compare Petitioner's sentence with those
imposed in other cases, has never afforded him an opportunity to
submit the facts of other cases for comparison, and has no power to
reduce the sentence on the basis of a finding of disproportionality.
No principle of law, or fair accessment of the facts supports the
statement that "no rational judge or jury could ••• have
determined" William Andrews did not deserve death.

The Court held

that in Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812, 815 (Utah 1980), not in
this Petitioner's case.
William Andrews did not kill anyone.

William Andrews was 19

years old at the time of his alleged involvement in this crime.
William Andrews had never before been convicted of a crime of
violence.

William Andrews came from a deprived background and a

broken home.

There was substantial evidence that he made some

attempt, however ineffectual, to stop these murders.

Surely--if a

rational juror could choose to spare the life of Joseph Paul
Franklin for the race-motivated cold blooded murder of two people,
or John Michael Calhoun for a similar crime in the course of a
burglary, or Gerald Brown for his vicious double homicide--a
rational juror could decide to spare the life of William Andrews,
who killed no one.
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Petitioner once again implores this Court to look
individually at his case and decide it under the same standards it
has used in others.

If it does, he submits that fairness and equal

protection require that his death sentence be reversed.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that this date I mailed two copies of the
fo~egoing

Petition for Rehearing, postage prepaid, addressed to:

Earl F. Dorius
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
DATED

this~-

day of December, 1983
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